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<Terrorism> in the Age of Obama: 
The Rhetorical Evolution of 
President Obama’s Discourse on 
the <War on Terror>
kelly lonG
Since the events that transpired on the morning of September 11
th, 2001, 
<terrorism> has become a part of the vocabulary of modern American 
culture. The word <terrorism> has become apowerful ideograph--a word or 
phrase that is abstract in nature, but has a great deal of ideological power-
-in American culture. This commonly used abstract word can be heard almost 
daily in the media and within the larger lexicon of American political discourse. 
Rhetoricians use the word to describe their motives and persuade audiences to align 
their ideological principles with those of the larger cause. This study examines how 
during President Barack Obama’s first year in office, he utilizes <terrorism> in 
opposition to the <rule of law> and <democratic values> in order to create a 
hybrid identity which combines the Democratic and Republican understanding of 
the issue that ultimately contributes to a sense of <exceptionalism>.
Since September 11th, 2001, the word <terrorism> has helped to shape and 
has been shaped by the culture of the American people who have come into 
contact with this concept on a daily basis in the media for over a decade. 
Because of this powerful ideograph, soldiers have fought and died in wars 
against a new breed of enemy in a battle against an idea; policies have shifted 
and changed along with protocols of collecting intelligence; lines have been 
drawn, crossed, and altogether erased in the metaphorical sands of alliance. 
History offers itself as proof that word wielded in the correct way can be more 
powerful than any superpower’s arsenal of military weaponry. <Terrorism> is 
one such word. 
<Terrorism> is an example of what rhetorical scholars call an ideograph, 
which is a high order abstraction found in everyday language used in political 
discourse which warrants the use of military, legislative, or financial power, 
excuses behavior and belief that might otherwise be considered eccentric or 
anti-social, and guides behavior and belief. An ideograph is also transcendent 
in nature – “having as much power and influence over the ruler as it has on 
the ruled” (McGee 1980). In order for the call to collective commitment to 
be successful, the individual using the ideograph is equally as invested in its 
definition as the general public who chooses to align their ideologies with it. 
Carol Winkler (2006) has explored how <terrorism> has been used by 
presidents since World War II. Winkler concluded that in the post-World 
War Era, two distinct and separate ideologies had formed in the ways that 
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Democratic and Republican presidents used <terrorism>. 
Democrats understand the issue of combating <terrorism> in 
the context of the justice system: <terrorism> is a criminal act 
that should be dealt with through means of police enforcement 
and punishable by judicial trial. Republicans see the <War on 
Terror> as a battle of good versus evil governed by morality. 
George W. Bush used <terrorism> to unite the nation and the 
world against a common ideological enemy, ushering in a new 
paradigm of foreign policy, marvelously Republican in nature. 
America’s new era, the <War on Terror>, would mean that the 
United States would have to tackle a new, diabolical enemy. 
Facing this foe would mean two of the longest and most 
expensive conflicts in the history of mankind. 
President Barrack Obama, during his first year in office, 
inherited this new era, as well as a foreign policy badly damaged 
by President Bush’s prosecution of the <War on Terror>. How 
did President Obama use <terrorism> as he put forth his 
foreign policy agenda? 
Literature Review
Across contexts, the meanings of words and power wielded by 
them changes and shifts dramatically. This is especially true in 
the case of high order abstractions, known as ideographs, which 
are terms, phrases, and images central to political ideology. 
According to McGee (1980) an ideograph is “an ordinary 
language term found in political discourse…representing 
collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-
defined normative goal that warrants the use of power, excuses 
behavior and belief that might otherwise be seen as eccentric 
or anti-social, and also guides behavior and belief ” (p. 15). In 
other words, ideographs have different functions and meanings 
for different demographic groups – racial, regional, religious, 
financial, gender, or generation – at different times in history. 
Those functions and meanings hold unique symbolic qualities 
that summarize prevailing attitudes and characteristics of a 
particular community. 
For example, <equality> is an ideograph that may hold different 
meanings for different groups over time and space. In 1896, 
the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) ruled in 
Plessy vs. Ferguson that separate spaces were equal in terms of 
resources and quality of schooling (Hasian & Condit, 1996). 
Although the term separate but equal was coined from Plessy vs. 
Ferguson, the reality was that African-American children had 
far less access to <equal> educational opportunities. Plessy vs. 
Ferguson. In 1954, SCOTUS reversed the separate but equal 
doctrine in Brown vs. the Board of Education. The Court argued 
the only possible way to achieve the goal of <equality> was to 
fully integrate the public school systems. <Equality> as defined 
in Brown vs. Board of Education, was the first action in the 
larger movement to desegregate public institutions within the 
United States. The ideograph of <equality> demonstrates how 
ideographs can provide different understandings of political 
precepts over time, while also offering intellectual support for 
specific policies and ideologies that can fundamentally alter a 
political culture. 
Ideographs can be analyzed in either a synchronic or diachronic 
fashion. Synchronic analysis is analogous to a snapshot or 
“vertical” approach because rhetorician is attempting to capture 
how that specific instance of an ideograph is being used at a 
singular point in time. For example, Amernic and Craig (2004) 
explored a Southwest Airlines (SWA) letter to shareholders 
following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. Their 
analysis produced “an example, in the extreme case of…cultural 
ideographs being appropriated to serve corporate ends” (p. 
327). Specifically, Amernic and Craig asserted SWA utilized 
the <Let’s Roll> allegory of Todd Beamer of United Airlines’ 
Flight 93 to imply that “SWA is an American (in the same 
manner as Todd Beamer) with ‘iron character’, ‘unquenchable 
spirit’, and ‘inspiring altruism’” (p. 332). In other words, <Let’s 
Roll> symbolized the character of Southwest Airlines in that 
moment and time. 
Analyzing ideographs diachronically works by sampling how 
a specific ideograph is used over a range of time, assessing 
its potential evolution within contemporary culture (e.g. the 
equality example from earlier). For instance, Towner (2010) 
examined the top selling country music group the Dixie 
Chicks. In 2004, the Dixie Chicks caused a media firestorm 
by criticizing President Bush’s prosecution of the <War on 
Terror>. Towner analyzed how the Dixie Chicks used the 
ideograph <patriotic>. He concluded that over time the use 
of <patriotic> by the Dixie Chicks came to mean multiple 
ideas, including the “exercise of <free speech>, <patriotic> as 
questioning/dialogue, <patriotic> as a voice of dissent, and 
<patriotic> as love for America” (p. 302). While their use of the 
ideograph <patriotic> divorced the band from their hardcore 
country fans, it introduced them to the larger American and 
global public, skyrocketing them to greater success than before.
Ultimately, ideographs have proven to be an effective means of 
examining a number of different rhetorical subjects. Pertinent 
to this study is how political leaders have used ideographs 
to advance their causes. For example, Althouse and Kuypers 
(2009) assert that John Pym, a member of the English House 
of Parliament during the reign of King Charles I, was able 
to enact legislation that would restrict the powers of both 
the royal throne and the church influence over Parliament. 
His appropriation of the ideographs <law>, <religion>, 
<justice>, and <Parliamentary Privilege> led the way to 
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reviving democracy in the House of Commons. These ideas 
would later prove influential in underwriting Anglo-American 
liberalism that would emerge in the American colonies over 
one hundred years later. Fast forward three hundred years 
later to contemporary England where British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher used the ideograph <terrorism> as a key 
factor in casting the situation within Northern Ireland as an 
<epic tragedy>. The juxtaposition of these ideographs allowed 
her to finagle an excuse to the media coverage of her campaign 
against Irish Republican Army (IRA), while also creating 
the symbolic groundwork to allow severe restrictions be put 
upon other civil liberties (Parry-Giles, 1995). By providing 
a state of necessity, she was able to get the public to accept 
her actions, even get them to ideologically align themselves 
with her prosecution of Britain’s terror fight against the IRA 
in the 1980s, demonstrating their collective commitment in a 
situation where normally her policies would have been viewed 
as dictatorial and tyrannical. 
The <terrorism> ideograph has also been a fundamental 
topic in presidential rhetoric. Winkler (2006) examined 
how American presidents since World War II have used this 
pejorative term in U.S. public discourse, and that Democrats 
and Republicans used it differently, which help serve and frame 
their overall foreign policy principles and specific foreign policy 
decisions. Valenzano (2006) extended Winkler’s findings by 
focusing on how President George W. Bush juxtaposed the 
ideographs <freedom> and <terror> together. He found that 
although Bush probably did not intend to justapose the two 
terms, he did manage to rally the nation against a common, 
universal enemy via his ambiguous use of the term <freedom> 
and manipulate the definition of <terror> to include “the threat 
of action, not just action itself ” (p. 161). Understanding how 
presidents use the ideograph of <terrorism> can provide insight 
into the specific policies they will enact in U.S. foreign policy 
and how that might impact America’s role in the world. This 
is because their actions must continue the ideological current 
circuiting through their rhetoric, or else the call for collective 
commitment will be unsuccessful. 
From these various studies we can draw some important 
conclusions. First, analyzing ideographs can be an important 
way of creating and understanding a particular vocabulary 
of a specific organization, social movement, and/or political 
party. Understanding these ideographs can determine specific 
motives, precepts, and policies rhetors to provide. Second, 
for the purpose of this study, analyzing ideographs within 
presidential rhetoric, particularly <terrorism> can assist us as 
United States citizens in understanding what, why, and how 
power is attained, maintained, and exercised across different 
contexts and circumstances. Ideographs are a powerful way 
to ascertain the motives, movements, and policies of various 
rhetors. In the following section, I extend the work of Winkler 
(2006) and Valenzano (2006) by examining how President 
Obama used the ideograph <terrorism> during his first year 
in office.
Methodology
In order to conduct an analysis of how President Obama used 
the ideograph <terrorism> I conducted a textual analysis of 
various speeches made by President Obama during his first 
term. I was able to locate these speeches from the American 
Presidency Project database run by the University of Southern 
California. It is a database that has every public pronouncement 
of American presidents since the founding of the Republic. 
Initially, I conducted a term search for the word “terrorism”. 
That led to over hundreds of different public documents 
using the term. I then narrowed my data set even further by 
eliminating public pronouncements that were not speeches and 
only mentioned <terrorism> in passing. I focused my analysis 
only on speeches that were dedicated to the specific discussion 
of <terrorism> and U.S. foreign policy, save for President 
Obama’s State of the Union Address. I included the State of 
the Union because it is arguably the most important policy 
speech a president will offer during any given year (Campbell 
& Jamieson, 2008). After narrowing my search I was left with 
over a dozen speeches to analyze. From there I began to read 
and take extensive notes, concluding that the most suitable 
approach to this subject would be a diachronic evaluation, 
assessing common patterns and dominant themes arising over 
time. This finally culminated in the development of several 
undeniably independent yet unmistakably interwoven themes 
that work together to highlight certain attributes each other 
and enhance their importance. In the discussion that follows, I 
do not use passages from each speech, but the textual fragments 
cited are representative samples of President Obama’s use of 
<terrorism>. 
President obama’s First Year of <terrorism>
When President Obama entered office in January of 2009, 
the Iraq War had been underway for six years, and the conflict 
would not be resolved for another three. To this day, the United 
States remains in Afghanistan after beginning the military 
expedition back in 2001, less than a month following the 
September 11th terrorist attacks. At the time Obama took office, 
public opinion of the two conflicts was extremely negative and 
had been on the decline for quite some time. On top of that, 
the nations of the world had borne witness to the previous 
administration’s disastrous foreign policy dealings, and Obama 
had to devote time and energy to repairing relationships and 
restoring the country’s reputation. Most importantly, he 
inherited an ideological responsibility to transition the public 
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from <terrorism> as Bush defined it to his own, understanding 
and execution of the term in his own rhetoric. 
<terrorism> as threat to Democratic Values
President Obama’s primary concern with the <terrorist> 
threat to democratic values was the undermining of them by 
<terrorist> groups, which are lawless organizations that do 
not operate under a constitution, in which anarchy reigns and 
chaos is king. Our sense of American identity is built upon 
our democratic values, specifically our unique understanding 
of the <rule of law>. Obama believed that the best offense is 
a good defense, and in preserving and maintaining the rule of 
law, we were to effectively combating terrorism by foiling it. 
Otherwise, the United States would fall into a similar state of 
lawlessness, madness, and turmoil. 
In order to demonstrate a necessity for engaging in combat 
with <terrorist> forces, Obama made their strikes against us 
personal rather than political. This is reminiscent of George 
W. Bush’s famous statement following the terrorist attacks 
of September 11th, 2001: “if you’re not with us, you’re for 
<terrorism>.” By striking at the heart of American ideals, the 
lone <terrorist> and the organization they represent strike at 
American identity. This sense of a collective self stems from 
the democratic values which our Declaration of Independence 
is based on: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Obama 
(2009g) emphasized that: “The main goal of <terrorists> is not 
only to spread fear and sow the seeds of instability, but also to 
undermine the basic values of our societies.”  Obama reasoned 
that by spreading fear and sowing the seeds of instability, the 
<terrorist(s)> would have undermined our basic societal values 
and that by doing so, they would shake the foundation of our 
nation. It is a self-sustaining, dependent relationship between 
the two variables. His usage of the term “fear” as a weapon used 
by <terrorist> to accomplish their goals is highly sentimental of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt inaugural address: “we have 
nothing to fear but fear itself ”.
This idea of combating fear as a method of weakening the 
<terrorist> opposition is simple and effective for the reason that 
it gives power back to the people. By specifically juxtaposing 
the <rule of law> against <terrorism>, Obama implied that one 
of the direct results from letting the “bad guys” win would be 
injustice and anarchy, a process of spiraling out of control. It 
puts a stopper in the plan to spread fear and sow the seeds 
of instability, and therefore the basic values of our society are 
not in jeopardy. This is why Obama used the <rule of law> 
specifically rather than grouping it in a general matter with the 
rest of our democratic values – its existence is critical in order 
for the others to be available, let alone successful. 
The physical acts of <terror> committed are a means to 
achieve the end – a thriving culture of fear and panic. The 
United States is a symbol of freedom, hope, and prosperity 
in the modern world; through intimidation, destruction, and 
murder, <terrorists> wish to extinguish the beacon of light 
that is America. Obama (2009e) stated that, “I believe that 
our Nation is stronger and more secure when we deploy the 
full measure of both our power and the power of our values, 
including the rule of law.” By encouraging the nation to 
rally around the core values of the American way of life, this 
further makes bullet-proof the ideas that strengthen feelings of 
patriotism that ultimately foils the terrorist plot. He juxtaposed 
the power of foreign policy, implicitly militaristically speaking, 
with the power of our values which soldiers fight to defend, 
therefore justifying the expenditure of troops overseas to fight 
the common enemy: <terrorism>.
President Obama illustrated that <rule of law> is the foundation 
upon which our <democratic values> are built, hence why he 
so specifically isolated the former in his foreign policy rhetoric. 
However, he spent a good deal of time emphasizing that, “…
the most effective response to their criminal strategy remains 
the promotion of democracy, human rights, the rule of law 
and equitable social conditions” (2009g). Obama had thrust 
the focus not on the opposition, but on the American team 
working together under the banner of the American dream. 
This exemplified the fact that <terrorists>, although clever 
and cunning of wit in the execution of their wicked deeds, 
do not have an over-arching goal to be achieved. Should their 
agenda ever be fulfilled, the organization would implode upon 
itself, for their identity stems only from their opposition and 
determination to destroy American identity. This is because 
the rhetoric of <terrorist> organizations does not have such 
strong values underlining their causes – meanwhile, American 
democratic values carry with them centuries of idealistic 
ideological baggage, and that, according to President Obama’s 
rhetoric, is worth its weight in the fight for freedom.
By developing an ideological justification for the conflicts that 
the United States was involved in at the time, Obama remedied 
much of the damage done by the Bush administration. 
Simultaneously, he was improving the nation’s image of self as 
well as its global reputation. The continuation of the wars led 
many citizens to ask why, and here, Obama provided a series 
of answers to that very inquiry. What worked to his advantage 
was the subjective nature of ideographs, in that each person 
prescribes their own meanings to the abstracts, and as a result 
they are more likely to support the movement if their definition 
aligns with the President’s, which in the case of protecting the 
<rule of law> and <democratic values>, it is difficult to disagree 
with him. This is one way in which he was able to successfully 
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generate support from the free nations of the world in his call 
for collective commitment and erase the line drawn between the 
Democrats and Republicans at home. By basing his rhetoric on 
universal ideals that make up the premise of the globe’s modern 
understanding of <rule of law> and <democratic values>, there 
was very little room for opposition or disagreement regarding 
the necessity to combat <terrorist> advances. 
<terrorism> as necessity for Collective Commitment
Long has there been conflict and tension building across the 
globe regarding American measures of national security, both 
at home and abroad. One inarguable point is that the <rule 
of law> and the rest of our <democratic values> should and 
must be defended at all costs, and in order to be victorious 
in this campaign, President Obama was bestowed the task of 
rallying not only his own partisan House behind him, but 
also invoking the allegiances of the free nations of the world. 
Shortly following the September 11th attacks, former President 
George W. Bush was the first leader of the free world to call for 
action on an international scale, by invoking NATO’s Article 5, 
as discussed by President Obama (2009d): “‘An attack on one 
is an attack on all.’ That is a promise for our time and for all 
time.” His choice of pronouns is extremely unified in nature, 
using inclusive possessive words, portraying <terrorism> as a 
common enemy, and therefore, the act of fighting back against 
them as a common cause. Obama (2009d) stated that, “…the 
choices we make in the coming years will determine whether 
the future will be shaped by fear or by freedom, by poverty 
of by prosperity, by strife or by a just, secure, and lasting 
peace.” He called upon emotions, images, and ideographs 
that the entirety of the free world is familiar with and closely 
connected to in order to rally them into action against a 
common enemy. Because Al Qaeda does not identify itself 
with any one country’s government or national constitution, 
they have already isolated themselves from any potential allies 
to a certain degree. Obama’s explanation of the necessity for 
collective commitment to secure these common values is 
based on safety in numbers. Obama emphasized the risk of 
countries acting independently, implying that they would fall 
to the agenda of <terrorism> if the nations of the world did not 
band together as one unit to battle this universal threat. Also, 
if he was successfully able to persuade NATO to act alongside 
or at least approve of his desired or selected course of action, 
Obama would have successfully justified, or at least excused, 
the United States occupation of the Middle East. 
President Obama faces extremely similar challenges on the 
home front, having to cooperate and often compromise with 
one of the most partisan House systems the country has seen in 
its short life of two hundred years. Obama (2009k) recognized 
this, explaining that “Years of debate over Iraq and terrorism 
have left our unity on national security issues in tatters and 
created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop for this 
effort.” Here, Obama refused to trivialize the issue – the word 
“tatters”, for example, insinuated the violent rhetoric put forth 
by both parties in their efforts to promote their campaign as to 
how the <War on Terror> should be handled. In order to bridge 
the gap between the two parties, President Obama, rather than 
cater to each individually, decided to forge a middle ground. 
He conjoined the morality of the Republican Party with the 
judicial perspective of the Democratic Party – making this an 
issue of good cop versus evil criminal, a hybridized version of 
the story. He accomplished this rhetorically by interweaving the 
two viewpoints: the basis of morality is religion, and the basis 
of justice is criminality, which are close enough in definition 
that Obama (2009l, see also 2009b and 2009g) was able to 
wield them almost synonymously: 
Evil does exist in the world. A nonviolent movement 
could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations 
cannot convince Al Qaida’s leaders to lay down their 
arms. To say that force may sometimes be necessary is 
not a call to cynicism; it is a recognition of history, the 
imperfections of man, and the limits of reason. 
This quotation portrays the two visions side by side, not 
only demonstrating their differences but highlighting their 
commonalities. He appealed to Republicans by applying pathos 
– the image of evil and the imperfections of man are rooted 
in moral understandings. On the other hand, Democrats 
were brought on board by logos, portrayed by the image of 
negotiation with a criminal in a hostage situation and alluding 
to the limits of reason. By juxtaposing these two ideological 
perspectives, Obama successfully adapted a rhetorical 
hybridism in order to appeal to both parties simultaneously. 
The end result of unifying the Capital is a sense of <American 
exceptionalism>, a phenomenon socially and academically 
recognized in the postmodern era, which is the belief held by 
Americans that our historic reputation precedes us and that 
we of are greater importance simply because of our citizenship 
and legacy of overcoming adversity. Much like the life cycle of 
any living organism, the country itself has experienced major 
milestones that allow it to grow and mature and nurture its 
own world view based upon them. There is a certain, inherent 
type of high-order responsibility bestowed unto the nation as 
a result of this sensation. Some view this as a form of false 
authority, of vanity and self-absorption, yet Obama (2009c) 
qualified that “…pragmatism must serve a common purpose, 
a higher purpose. That’s the legacy that we inherit. And that, 
in the end, is how government of the people, and by the 
people, and for the people, will endure in our time.” Once 
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again, Obama provided motivation for the Republicans and 
the Democrats to work together towards a common goal: 
eradicating <terrorism> in the modern world. He invokes 
history, appeals to patriotism, and projects the focus upon 
protecting the people that the House is supposed to represent, 
serve, and ultimately, protect. 
Conclusion
 Despite the difficult challenges of overcoming the damaging 
foreign policy rhetoric of the Bush Administration in a post-
9/11 world, President Barrack Obama successfully established 
his own unique rhetoric regarding the <War on Terror>. By 
juxtaposing <terrorism> to <democratic values>, specifically 
the <rule of law> in particular, Obama was able to convey 
a message that called for collective commitment on a global 
scale. He simultaneously bridged the split between the partisan 
two-party system, merging the Republican morality complex 
with the Democratic judicial perspective, reminding both the 
politicians and the people of the United States of America 
of their legacy of exceptionalism. President Barrack Obama 
efficiently developed an ideology and successfully launched an 
ideographic campaign that established the groundwork for his 
next three years in office in dealing with foreign policy affairs. 
Today, the <War on Terror> is considered over, but not yet 
done with. In order to understand what lies ahead, we must 
continue to look back into an exploration of President Obama’s 
handlings of <terrorism> during its final years of legislative 
debate and how the ideograph is handled in the post-<War 
on Terror> era. From there, we can develop a contemporary 
and working understanding of how <terrorism> is evolving 
at this moment in politics, media, and foreign policy. This 
way, we will be able to comprehend the impact and efficacy of 
President Barrack Obama’s ideographic campaign, and be able 
to appreciate the rhetorical legacy that the next Commander-
in-Chief will inherit. 
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